In the eighteenth century, insanity was widely explained within the Lockean philosophical framework of enlightened rationality: delusions or illusions, basically erroneous thinking, led human reason into the wrong. By the beginning of the nineteenth century, after the French Revolution and in the midst of the transformations which the industrial revolution brought about, new theories of insanity emerged. The realm of unsoundness changed its character and became as unfathomable as the epoch appeared to many who were witnessing it. Increasingly, cases of insanity became known where the patients did not seem to dwell in some delusive state. They displayed deep sullenness, unmitigated fury, utter shamelessness, seemingly without either purpose or motivation.
In the eighteenth century, insanity was widely explained within the Lockean philosophical framework of enlightened rationality: delusions or illusions, basically erroneous thinking, led human reason into the wrong. By the beginning of the nineteenth century, after the French Revolution and in the midst of the transformations which the industrial revolution brought about, new theories of insanity emerged. The realm of unsoundness changed its character and became as unfathomable as the epoch appeared to many who were witnessing it. Increasingly, cases of insanity became known where the patients did not seem to dwell in some delusive state. They displayed deep sullenness, unmitigated fury, utter shamelessness, seemingly without either purpose or motivation.
One of the constructs newly used to explain the evidence was the concept of moral insanity. It referred to a derangement of those mental faculties which presided over man's emotive framework as well as his moral faculty. It was formulated by the Bristol doctor James Cowles Prichard (1786 Prichard ( -1848 , who put it forward first in 1833, in an article in The cyclopaedia ofpractical medicine.' In the Treatise on insanity, published in 1835, he gave his account of medical knowledge on madness,2 inscribing moral insanity into medical nosology and embedding the doctrine in his medical philosophy. In the course of his elaborations of the concept, Prichard presented a number of case studies which he had solicited from other doctors in order to prove his theory. One of these was the case of "a gentleman" provided by his Bristol colleague, John Addington Symonds, who reported that: In his social relations [the gentleman] had become fickle, suspicious, and irascible; he was reckless in his expenditure, and uncertain in his projects, while his general behaviour was such as to impress almost every one who came in contact with him. [However, there was no] evidence that he entertained any belief in things morally or physically impossible, or in opposition to the general opinion of mankind.... [He] had suffered a severe concussion of the brain, and since his recovery had conducted himself more extravagantly than ever. He advertised for sale property which he knew to be entailed; after a little increase of income by the death of a near relative, he commenced great This article proposes to look at two issues: first, it will probe the theoretical predicaments which inspired Prichard to come up with the concept of moral insanity, and in the course of this Prichard's previously neglected sources will be examined. Second, the paper will also discuss the concept of moral insanity itself and enquire into its underlying implications as well as into the functions which it fulfilled within Prichard's political and religious viewpoints. In particular, I will ask how far "moral insanity" was an expression of Prichard's religious views and to what extent it was presented as a response to the rise of capitalist society.
In the contemporary historiography of madness, there is a strong urge to unmask the economic or professional interests which informed the medical theories of nineteenthcentury alienists. Scholars such as Andrew Scull, David Mellett, and Richard Russell have helped to put the history of madness into perspective.9 At first sight, the case described above may appear as evidence of Prichard's desire to enlarge the juridical competencies of his profession. But a closer look reveals that his work allows this kind of analysis to only a very limited extent. To read his writings in this light would be to mistake the actual non-medical sub-text of his theories. Since this paper involves many different components it may be useful to give a short outline of what it proposes to do. By retracing Prichard's route to moral insanity, I wish to demonstrate that the theory reflected Prichard's dismay at the decline of religion in a materialist age. Yet, the concept of moral insanity was not merely the disillusioned response of a cultural pessimist to everything he disliked about his epoch. By explaining madness within the framework of humoralism as a bodily constitution, Prichard dispensed with the idea that reason was the supreme arbiter of humanity. He showed madness to be part of the human condition: anybody was liable to become mad. The descent into madness proper was the result of accidental circumstances. By virtue of this theory Prichard defied the pretensions of the phrenologists who claimed to have found a key to the human psyche. In his anti-phrenological approach, based on non-cerebral sources of madness, Prichard was heavily inspired by German Romantic medicine. However, it was only in the 1840s that he finally acknowledged the intimate links between German teachings and his theory of moral insanity. How London, Routledge, 1989 ; idem, The most solitary of insanity', Aust. N.Z J. Psychiatry, 1967, 1: 72-9. afflictions: madness and society in Britain, 9 D J Mellett, The prerogative of asylumdom, 1700 -1900 Haven, Yale University Press, New York, Garland, 1982 ; Richard Russell, 'Mental 1993 .
Deflinitions of Moral Insanity
The term "moral insanity" had already been employed in the eighteenth century by Thomas Arnold and Benjamin Rush. But they saw the perversion of the moral sense as a result of madness-not as the definition of the disorder. Their ideas, therefore, had little to do with Prichard's understanding of the term.10 Prichard himself saw parallels between the notion of moral insanity and the theory of Jean Etienne Dominique Esquirol , the famous Paris mad-doctor." Prichard even averred that Esquirol had identified the salient characteristic of moral insanity-the absence of intellectual delusion.12 He was justified in so far as Esquirol had introduced "the view that the obsessional disorders were a form of insanity",.13 Ironically, however, the French alienist dissociated himself explicitly from Prichard's definition of moral insanity, for Esquirol insisted that all forms of madness were accompanied by a lesion of the understanding.'4 Only after Esquirol's death in 1840 would Prichard no longer refer "moral insanity" to the French doctor's concept of "monomania". In 1842 he wrote: "With great deference to this justly celebrated physician we venture to observe that the term monomania does not appear applicable to a disorder which is not characterised by any particular error or delusion". 15 But there are other authors whom Prichard read and quoted and whom, in his Treatise on insanity, he did not credit with having inspired him.
Prichard was a very pious man. Born in Ross, Herefordshire, in 1786, he was brought up in Bristol as a Quaker. Even though, in 1810, he converted to Anglicanism, he never forsook stern religious concern and a literal belief in Scripture's tenets which became increasingly rare among his fellow-scientists. Prichard's father was a merchant with a penchant for erudition, so his son was given the opportunity to study medicine in Edinburgh where he became familiar with the doctrines of Scottish Enlightenment philosophy and medical theory. Subsequently he became a doctor in Bristol where he treated pauper lunatics as well as more affluent patients. Throughout his life, Prichard's energies were divided between the medical profession and his investigations into anthropology and philology. His anthropology was transcendental and deeply teleological: he was interested in moral redemption, intellectual and cultural perfection. He saw man in the light of final causes and was not concerned with the tedious fetters of physical circumstances which prevented him from fulfilling his rational and moral potential. A resume of Prichard's scholarly endeavours-anthropological as well as physiologicalcan be made in four words: to save man's soul. 10 Thomas Arnold, Observations on the nature, near Paris (Prichard' Prichard voted Tory. He adhered to notions of paternalism that he considered to be under threat from political radicalism and economic utilitarianism. His cosmos was thoroughly divided. There was the religious sphere which was horizontally organized, all men being equal in the eyes of God; and there was the world of men which was vertically structured, consisting of hierarchies whose existence-as the French Revolution had proved-was vital for political coherence as well as the persistence of religion. 16
This short profile of Prichard appears at odds with his formulation of a theory like that of moral insanity which smacked of novelty and whose nosology, as will be explained, came dangerously close to the tenets of F J V Broussais who was derided as a materialist. That Prichard should have devised such a theory is all the more surprising since certain aspects of it seemingly contradicted his own earlier work. In 1822, he had published a Treatise on diseases of the nervous system, in many respects a conventional account of insanity, devised along the lines of the Lockean notion that a madman had lost his wits, but not his soul.17 It fulfilled two purposes. First, Prichard used it to refute the popular, non-medical idea that the soul or mind itself could be diseased. Second, he employed it to defend religion against materialists who located madness in the brain and reduced the soul to a function of the brain. Against both of these notions Prichard pitted the idea that insanity consisted in a faulty transmission of data from the brain into the mind. Madness, in other words, arose from some organic malfunctioning either in the brain or in the nervous system more generally. The brain was not the organ of mind but the intermediary between the body and the immaterial reasoning powers. How the brain related to the reasoning faculty, Prichard thought to be a medical mystery which man was not given to penetrate.'8 All he knew for sure was that madness was seated in the nervous system, whereas the mind was "in no wise involved in the calamity".'9 But owing to some mechanico-chemical disorder in the nervous system the mind was led to take for "memory" what in fact was merely "reverie", so that its reasoning operations subsequently went amiss.20 By putting forward this explanation, Prichard saw himself as following in the tradition of William Cullen, a teacher of James Gregory whose courses on medical practice Prichard had attended at Edinburgh.21 Indeed, the highest medical authorities had 16 For Prichard's biography see the entry under his name in Charles Coulston Gillispie (ed.), Dictionary of scientific biography, New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 16 vols, 1970-1980, vol. Press, 1987. i.e. the bumps. Throughout his life Prichard railed against this theory,29 but over time he was to change his arguments.
At Edinburgh University, Prichard had become acquainted with the common-sense philosophy of Dugald Stewart and Thomas Reid. Its tenets were readily reconcilable with Christian theology. Diametrically opposed to these doctrines and yet structurally very similar were the ideas of Gall and Spurzheim. Both systems presupposed certain innate faculties: a moral sense, natural affections, the power of understanding, etc. But while the common-sense philosophers referred these to the immaterial mind, the phrenologists, in locating them in the brain, underlined their material nature. This notion was tied to Gall's inference "that the moral and intellectual world of man begins where the brain begins, and that it ends where the brain ends". This theory appeared to Prichard all the more pernicious as Gall doubted the perfectibility of human morals. If people could fall back into ignorance and barbarism, this was, for Gall, due to the physical limits which their brains posed to the development of the moral faculties.30
Prichard's Treatise on diseases ofthe nervous system aimed at refuting the central tenets of phrenology, including what he perceived as a debasement of humanity. He strove to show (1) that the supreme faculties of the mind were independent of the bodily constitution;31 (2) that for the exercise of the lower faculties of perception and sensation (i.e. those which could be perturbed) the entire nervous system was at least as important as the brain itself;32 and (3) that some forms of madness, such as epilepsy, were-"in some unknown way"-ultimately referable to an "irritated portion of the stomach or intestines" or "disease in the liver, and other abdominal viscera"-and therefore not to some lesion of the cerebral structure.33 His tactic was to discount the role of the brain alone, playing down its significance for mental processes, whether in sickness or in health. It was an approach which Prichard never forsook. The problem was, however, that the main hypothesis of the 1822 book could not be sustained. It became increasingly impossible to assert that mental processes were independent of the particular conformation of the brain, for, during the 1820s, a rising number of pathological anatomists attributed insanity to lesi6ns of specific parts of the brain. The The question which engaged many mad-doctors was whether insanity was regularly accompanied by a physical lesion of the brain. Until 1820, it was commonly assumed that in many cases of madness, there were no lesions to be discovered. Implicitly, this view bolstered the notion that the brain was not the organ of mind. But in the 1820s the tide changed, the "seekers after the 'sick organs"' gained in confidence. Especially among French medical men, lack of pathological evidence was taken as a proof of the immaturity of pathological techniques rather than as a fact.35 Prichard London, 1996. 46 The American alienist Pliny Earle saw it as the first German journal on insanity of some standing.
"The influence of the Journal was", as Earle put it, "favourable to the cause of the insane, as it" inter alia "awakened in its readers . . . an interest in the improvement of hospitals"; see Pliny Earle, Institutions for the insane in Prussia, Austria and Germany, New York, Wood, 1854, pp. 5-16, 19-26, 28-9 , quote from Hunter and Macalpine, op. cit., note 10 above, p. 1015. then, at the latest, that he became acquainted with these particular German theories of madness. Indeed, Prichard's footnotes in his 1835 treatise on insanity reveal that he paid a lot of attention to the Zeitschrift and the articles of one of its most eminent editors, Maximilian Jacobi.48
Deeply involved in Romantic philosophizing, the contributors of the Zeitschrift tried to defend what they perceived as real and inner human values against superficial French rationality. Practising in Halle and Bonn, Nasse (1778-185 1) was a pupil of Johann Christian Reil.49 Jacobi (1755-1858) was the son of a famous philosopher who had been a companion of Goethe.50 Their politics of the body bolstered the notion of a holistic interplay between all parts of the body and the soul, while at the same time, they believed in a distinct hierarchy in which the soul was constantly at odds with the flesh. When the body took over, the state of health as well as the morality of the individual was in danger. Nasse, Jacobi, and a Dresden doctor called Franz Francke (1796-1837) propounded the idea that there existed a form of mental dislocation which was caused by diseases of the visceral organs and which expressed itself solely in a derangement of the emotions. Starting from the position of Cartesian dualism, turning himself against Stahl's animism and Heinroth's exuberant idealism as well as the psychical materialism which many zealous anatomists proposed,5' Francke asserted, in 1824, what Prichard had suggested two years earlier, namely that madness was "a sympathetic disease of the brain" whose original source was an organic disease in the viscera. He said, "The essence, the natural cause of psychical disease resides in the body",52 and expressly turned against those pathologists for whom anatomical evidence of brain disorder was a guide to the seat and nature of the disease.53 Nasse mocked "the doctrine, repeated in all physiological textbooks, that the soul must have a distinct seat somewhere in the body". He saw the entire living body as a unity, and hence madness affected the whole of man's physical appearance.54 It may be, Jacobi wrote, that the manifestations of the reasoning faculty are almost fully intact, and "none the less there is mental disturbance". For, "this or that side of the emotional life may be affected" by some disease of "certain parts of the organism".55 These views are so nearly allied to the theory of moral insanity that it appears quite likely that the German texts left their trace in Prichard's mind. 48 Prichard, op. cit., note 2 above, pp. 32, 116-17, 138, 169, 178, 184, 194-98, 237-42, 248 . 49 
Humoralism versus Phrenological Materialism
That the viscera could lie at the roots of madness Prichard had already said in 1822. But then, he had seen the emotions and the understanding as mental faculties which were untouchable by organic operations. The Nasse school, too, directed their efforts against phrenology, but, unlike Prichard, they had no qualms about theorizing on the interrelationship between body and mind. Jacobi, in particular, criticized the traditional approach to madness which, in his opinion, had always wrongly focused on the understanding. For the nosology of madness, as he saw it, the emotional framework was more important than the understanding.56 "The melancholic", Jacobi said, "is not plunged into his disease by virtue of this or that sad idea, rather the idea arises because he suffers from some such disease". Prichard quoted the phrase approvingly when reporting a case where he himself had acted as the consulting physician.57 According to the Nasse school, at the onset of most cases of madness there existed a derangement of the emotions brought about by a disease in parts of the organism. This could-but need not necessarily-lead to a deranged understanding.58 While the latter disease was indeed seated in the brain,59 dislocated emotions signified a disease of the visceral organs, be it the heart, the liver, the stomach or a part of the intestines.60 Thus the way was paved for the pathology of moral insanity.
In pitting the diseases of the passions against those of the intellect, the Germans relied heavily on the time-honoured doctrine of humoralism. 62 Jacobi, op. cit., note 55 above, vol. 1, p. 70. 63 Prichard stressed that "a certain peculiarity of natural temperament or habit of body is a necessary condition for the development of insanity" (op. cit., note 2 above, p. 157), he adopted a classification of madness derived from humoralism (ibid., pp. 168-9). 64 Prichard, 'Temperament', in op. cit., note 1 above, vol: 4, pp. 159-74.
nineteenth-century version of humoralism did without the notion that any given temperament was due to the superabundance of a particular bodily fluid. Instead, as Francke put it, temperament referred simply to "the specific individual constitution of physico-psychical life".65 This implied, in Jacobi's words, that "there are as many different temperaments as there are different individuals".66 Prichard expressed himself in a similar manner. After having declared that moral insanity referred to the "preternatural excitement of the temper and spirits", he specified that "in fact, the varieties of moral insanity are perhaps as numerous as the modifications of feeling or passion in the human mind".67
In this interpretation, the temperaments were being proffered as indicators of man's psychological constitution.68 Jacobi contended that "the impact which the brain exerts on the psyche [was] far less well established" than that of the temperaments.69 Humoralism was used to found a bodily system of emotions which could not be explained by reference to processes within the brain. potential of the German approach.87 German theories of the human mind as well as of madness were native to German intellectual traditions. To some extent this was a question of language: the German word Gemiut has no exact equivalent in English. Prichard translated it as "sentiment", but Gemut is more than that. It refers to the emotional disposition or the moral framework of man, and relates to the understanding, as heart relates to brain. Hence German semantics suggested a classification of madness which naturally included the notion of diseased emotions. It enabled Prichard to regard the passions as ontologically distinct from the other faculties of the mind.88
While Prichard referred the passions and the understanding to the realm of physical materiality, there was one faculty which was exempt. Following the German distinction between the mental faculties, Prichard conceived not only the complementary duality of sentiment and understanding, but also added a third principle, judgement, the English term for Vernunft. Unlike the powers of sentiment and understanding, this third component of German idealist philosophy remained the link between man's mind and God's spirit. In English, understanding, reasoning and judgement are not always clearly distinguished. Prichard, too, confused them. In German, by contrast, due not least to Immanuel Kant, the insanity was developed merely within the framework of common-sense philosophy.93 This, however, is at best half the truth. It was only by virtue of the German idealist philosophy of mind which assigned judgement its special cognitive position, that Prichard could accept the notion of unbalanced mental faculties such as perverted emotions and deranged understanding, without consigning the soul to the realm of physical causation.94 And this in turn enabled him to associate the emotions with the bodily constitution, whence he derived a theory of psychical disorder which was designed to defy the phrenological system.
Hitherto, many historians have regarded the intellectual struggles over the relationship between the body and the mind in the 1820s and 1830s mainly as a binary opposition between two camps: the physicalists or somatists versus the spiritualists-as they are called in France-or the mentalists as they are referred to in England.95 Indeed, Maximilian Jacobi was in his time the spearhead of the somatists who attributed the aetiology of mental diseases exclusively to the body, and he was deeply embroiled in quarrels with the rival faction of the psychicists, represented by Heinroth. However, their skirmishes must not be translated into the handy dichotomy between "materialist" somatists and "pious" psychicists. As Verwey has rightly stressed, the quarrels between the two factions did not amount to the simple antagonism between body-centred and mind-centred explanations for insanity. It is true that they argued with each other over whether the aetiology of mental diseases should be placed in the body or in the soul. This difference was mirrored in their politics: the Somatists tended towards liberalism, while the followers of Heinroth harboured a more conservative outlook which led them to view mental disorder as a product of immorality.96 But they all spoke as one when it came to fighting "the one-sided, physically-oriented, 'mind-less' medicine of the Aufklarungs 1,, 97 era In the desire to leave the realm of the immaterial soul untainted by physicalist theory, the Nasse school applied, as it were, the mind-body dualism to the relationship between parts of the body itself. While materialist physiology had chosen the brain as its stronghold, the somatists focused on the rest of the body as the realm which was 93 An anonymous reviewer of the Treatise on insanity wrote: "Let Dr. Prichard, however, confess that nearly all this new light on the subject of moral insanity has burst on M. Esquirol, on himself, and on the Scotch metaphysical school, since the appearance of Gall's immortal work on the anatomy and functions of the brain"; Lancet, 1834-35, ii: 703- expressive of, and governed by, forces which were neither rational nor even connected to the organ of rationality. But they were not materialists. In the end the very notion of an organism whose parts, through the mechanism of sympathy, were all linked to each other as well as to the soul, contradicts this interpretation. Jacobi's insistence on physical sources of madness did not aim to reduce the operations of the mind to physical causes. Rather he was defying the attempts of Pinel and Heinroth to explain all mental phenomena through occurrences of which the individual was conscious or could at least give an account. He rejected Heinroth's emphasis that madness was the outcome of sin. And he poked fun at Pinel's assumption that a madman himself might be able to explain what plunged his mind into disorder.98 Pinel too regarded inflammation of the viscera as a source of mental disorder.99 But in Jacobi's opinion, Pinel had made a bad choice when he rejected the diagnostic system of humoralism in favour of the practice of asking his patients whether they had experienced "distress or misfortunes". 10 This was a naive and ludicrous approach to diagnosis: "Who has not experienced distress or misfortunes?", Jacobi asked rhetorically.'0' If madness struck, it was the result of the disposition and constitution of the individual, not of problems which were part of human life.
Despite opposing this psychological approach to diagnosis, Jacobi was not against psychological explanations in general. But for him, that part of man's mental framework which was open to medical treatment was mediated through the bodily constitution. After all it was here where sentiments made themselves felt: anxiety infested the stomach, sadness infected the heart; here "madness lights up the candles which create the illusions that lead the understanding into the wrong".102 In the theories of the somatists, physiological tenets joined with the repertoire of Romantic criticism. To regard madness primarily as a disease of the viscera was a corollary of the fact that Romanticism considered the understanding as the poorer, merely instrumental part of the human character. Accordingly, the brain as the instrument of the understanding was of lower transcendental value than those organs which were in bilateral intercourse with the emotions. As Jacobi put it, "the holiest powers of man which constitute his actual value, his humanity, reside in his sentiment [Gemith] ".103 In short, for the German somatists, the visceral organization of the body had more to do with the transcendental nature of man than had the brain, and this was the idea that lay behind Jacobi's quip that "there are certain morbid changes in the organisation" which ultimately lead to an impairment "of moral freedom".104 98 (1) They saw insanity as an organic disorder with, quite often, its primary seat in the viscera and not in the brain.
(2) They referred to a modernized form of humoralism to establish a matrix which made emotions nosologically amenable. This went together with a new interest in the systematic exploration of human psychology. The emergent discipline of psychology was intertwined with anthropology and medicine. Man's psychologicat framework paralleled, on a higher level, animal instincts. The individual human psyche was the result of the interaction between the individual (humoral) constitution and the external environment. Hence the faculties of rationality and emotions could no longer be regarded as purely spiritual.
(3) Their theories of madness accounted for the perversion of the emotions and the understanding. In so far as they referred mental faculties to material nature, they advanced theories akin to materialism. But unlike materialists, they assigned the faculty of judgement a special position: it remained aloof, being principally separated from the realm of nature.
(4) They consciously formulated theories of madness which reflected their dismay about contemporary materialistic tendencies. In particular they strove to defy the phrenological threat through the combined efforts of their anthropological and physiological endeavours. In general, their scholarship was imbued by the metaphysical project to validate the transcendental nature of man within the language of science.
Prichard's Conversion to Jacobi's Theory Although Prichard followed Jacobi's theory in many particulars, in the 1830s he was not ready to admit a relationship between the concept of moral insanity and Jacobi's doctrines of the pathology of madness. This was due to the materialistic connotations of somaticism. Prichard disowned the brain as the seat of the emotive faculties, so that it could not be taken as the seat of the soul.106 However, he was not prepared either to let in materialism through the back door by admitting that all mental states were ultimately the result of bodily conformations. This was what, in the eyes of many of his contemporaries, Jacobi's somaticism amounted to. As we have seen, Jacobi was deeply pious. None the less, many objections to his stance in the physicalist-mentalist debate were raised by religious critics. Also, his claim that madness was a non-cerebral disorder agreed in some particulars with the views of Broussais who was condemned for his materialism. In 1835 Prichard was sceptical of Broussais's attempt to refer insanity to "irritations ... in the digestive organs", that was "a position which, before it can be idmitted, requires proof; and no such proof has been afforded". For Another theory which strove to explain madness as a disease of the viscera was Pinel's "manie sans d6lire".108 Like Prichard's moral insanity, it conceived of a form of madness which did not involve a derangement of the understanding. But unlike Prichard, who conceived extreme eccentricity as a typical syndrome of moral insanity, Pinel had characterized "manie sans delire" as a frenzy of the passions, involving great rage and violence. Prichard could not reconcile himself to the idea that simple disorders in the bowels could induce "that intense excitement of malevolent propensity which leads to murder and suicide". 109 In his view, all extreme positions based on ambiguous pathological investigations were suspect: it was wrong to define madness as a function of cerebral disorder, and equally mistaken to attribute it merely to the viscera. As a safeguard against that position Prichard retained the brain as the organ which mediated between the external world and human conscience. He favoured the notion "that particular conditions of the brain are intermediately and instrumentally co-operative, and interposing themselves between the disorder of the organ primarily affected, and the state of mind or temper which is traced as its manifestation or accompaniment'.110 Thus Prichard repeated his theory from 1822.1"' He introduced the Belgian alienist Joseph Guislain as an authority who had set out the same idea. Guislain was also the author to whom Prichard referred in order to differentiate between the faculty of judgement and other mental faculties.112 The correlation shows Prichard's tendency to let philosophy take precedence over anatomical assumptions. As for the anatomical evidence itself, Prichard relied on the theories of Achille-Louis Foville, whom he understood to have combined the idea of insanity as cerebral inflammation with the notion that in some cases the disease was located in the viscera.113 Prichard tried to steer a middle way between all possible positions. None the less, even to him the results were not altogether satisfactory: moral insanity in particular posed a problem. Why should a type of disorder which did not involve the understanding but only the emotions leave its imprint on the anatomical make-up of the brain? Indeed, Prichard concluded that "the instances of mental disorder which leave the greatest doubt with respect to the presence of disease in the brain are those of moral insanity". Had Prichard designated the brain as the locus of the passions and the sentiments, he would not have had this problem. But his theoretical opposition to phrenology, which induced him to see the sentiments as part and parcel of the overall bodily constitution, necessarily led him into this aporia. In other words, he had devised moral insanity in order to fight the phrenologists, but once the forces of the body were unleashed, they appeared to threaten his dualist world view.
It was only between the late 1830s and early 1840s, that he finally made up his mind and yielded to the theories of the Nasse school, accepting moral insanity as a disease of the viscera. In 1844 Prichard published a brief article reporting a typical case of moral insanity and revising his former position.114 Now he praised Jacobi wholeheartedly: his "various works on subjects connected with insanity, equally remarkable for the practical sense as for the deep philosophical investigation which they display, entitle their author to the highest rank among the living writers of this class."115 Neither Prichard, nor Jacobi had changed his theoretical approach to insanity. Nor had Prichard read texts by Jacobi which presented the German alienist in a new light. The truth is that Prichard had come to see Jacobi with other eyes. We have seen that he founded his views on the participation of the brain in mental disorder on a publication by Guislain. Jacobi had, in 1830, argued against Guislain's theory, Prichard had taken notice of it, without, however, assigning any importance to Jacobi's criticism.116 By 1844, in contrast, this was exactly the passage which Prichard summarized in order to point out the similarity between his views and those of Jacobi. He wrote: Jacobi has not expressed his opinion precisely in this manner; but it would appear ... that he looks upon effects produced upon the sensorium and the mind, through the medium of the stomach, or any of the viscera of physical life, as not less immediately brought about by the action of the material organism on the intellectual or sensitive power, than the impressions produced in the mind by a blow on the head, or by any powerful agency exerted immediately on the brain.
The sequence of events as Jacobi saw it was, Prichard continued, intimately related to his own theory of moral insanity. More expressly than before, he presented moral insanity as a disease whose very existence proved the wrongfulness of phrenology: In 1844, he regretted that "in England and France, the principal, if not the almost undivided attention of anatomists has been directed to the discovery of morbid changes in the brain". The Germans, even though they were generally neither "more practical" nor "sound", had at least taken "a different course": the school of Nasse, in particular, directed the attention of pathologists to connections which are often to be traced between the different manifestations of insanity and various morbid phenomena discovered after death in the organs subservient to physical life [i. and moral insanity separately in chs 5 and 9 of On might have come to another conclusion. the differentforms of insanity, in relation to Jacobi was credited with assenting to Prichard's theory of moral insanity, i.e., "that a mental disorder exists, fully to be recognised by particular trains of symptoms, in which the moral, not the intellectual, part of the human mind is essentially disturbed".124 Prichard's little article from 1844 concluded the issues which have been discussed so far, namely his defiance of the phrenologists through the theory of moral insanity, and the notion that moral insanity was tied to a disorder in the viscera and thus to the entire constitution of the body.
Moral Insanity: a Product of Self-Centredness How deeply the theory of moral insanity was informed by implicit belief systems which stood in an indirect and complicated relationship with medicine itself may become evident in the following example. Prichard presented the pathological findings in question as if he had only been waiting for anatomical evidence to prove that moral insanity arose from a disease of the viscera. He cited the case of "a lady highly accomplished, and of great mental endowments, pious, affectionate, and sincere" who suddenly became "low-spirited and hypochondriacal". At the same time she refused to eat. When her friends and family urged her, she complained about pains in the abdomen. "Her whole temper and character became changed. Formerly devoted to her duties, and to works of benevolence to others, she now thought only of herself, and her complaints". Finally, she was sent into an asylum where she "was induced, though not without great difficulty, and a constant threat of compulsion if she resisted, to take a moderate quantity of the most nutritious and digestible food". Subsequently she died. The dissection showed that her intestinal canal was beset with ulcers and tubercles. Now, instead of concluding, that this woman was not mad, but did indeed suffer terrible pain and therefore had reason to reject food, Prichard took the morbid evidence in the abdomen as testifying to the truth of his theory on moral insanity:
... the perpetual complaints made by the patient of pain and suffering in the abdomen had an organic cause, and were not unreal, as it had been sometimes suspected. As these complaints had been uniform, and had continued from the commencement of the disease, it may be inferred as highly probable that the organic disease in the intestinal canal had been coeval with the mental disorder, and the foundation of the whole train of morbid symptoms. The history of this case furnishes, on this view, an example of insanity mainly dependant on a diseased state of organs very remote from the brain.125
It is significant that Prichard described the patient as being obsessed with herself-"she now thought only of herself'. To identify self-centredness as a feature of insanity was common also among the members of the Nasse school. Thus Jacobi wrote that the "forces of selfishness" strive in man "against revelation", only by overcoming the "forces of nature" could man's soul liberate itself. But time and again, nature proved stronger. Jacobi concluded: "Nothing can stop man in this temptation, which threatens shattering and extinction, but the firm belief in the Truth . . . of revelation".126 Unlike Esquirol's pupils in France, the somaticist branch of German Romantic physiology explicitly and persistently referred to metaphysical convictions; in their understanding, insanity was concomitant, as it were, with a break-up of the ties which linked an individual to his transcendental nature.127 In that sense, Prichard and Jacobi made common cause. Both of them partook seriously in the anxieties of their age, the uprooting of traditional hierarchies, subsequent social upheavals, a burgeoning acquisitiveness hitherto unknown, scientific materialism-it was all indicative of far-reaching moral depravity. In a speech in 1835, Prichard sighed about "these days, when intellect is deified and worshipped as the sole divinity".128 The country which seemed to furnish ample reason for misgivings was France. In the wake of the revolution, religious observance had reached an all-time low. Selfish passions were no longer held in check. Jacobi implicitly conflated socially egoistic behaviour with the exaggerated self-centredness of the insane. In the end, both were attributable to loss of religion. Prichard saw things similarly. He translated a passage from Jacobi on the moral debasement of the French: "the generality of men have their understanding impaired through the influence of lower passions, and of vices" which Jacobi considered as "so much the more prevalent" as the Christian moral standard was on the decline.129
For Britain, the writing was on the wall. In 1831, Prichard's home town Bristol was shaken by a riot of labourers and paupers. The major public buildings were burned down, troops were called in. -In the end, not only were the chief rioters put on trial but also a military captain, the mayor and aldermen were arraigned for their "apathetic" conduct during the upheaval.130 In short, it seemed that nobody, neither the poor nor their betters, had lived up to their civic duties. Not only France, but Britain too gave reason for concern. 131 Esquirol, in his time the greatest and most influential authority on alienation in France, was politically conservative enough to provide Prichard with rich quotes on the detrimental effects of moral decline. But unlike Jacobi, Nasse and Prichard, Esquirol engaged with French positivism, and his theories did not revolve around notions of redemption and life after death. Hence Esquirol's misgivings as to the contemporary state of morality were tied rather more to the course of civilization than to the individual's readiness to transcend his own self.132 By the time Napoleon had been despatched to St. Rousseau, it was evident that civilized man had so far departed from propriety and decency that madness must be on the rise. Prichard chose Esquirol's texts to express his own misgivings.'33 "During the last thirty years," Prichard said through the words of Esquirol, "the changes which have taken place in our manners in France, have been productive of more cases of insanity than our political torments". With the demise of religious observance in France, Esquirol stated, "demonomania and superstitious madness have disappeared". But instead of ushering in an epoch which was mentally saner, this change caused the reverse to happen. The pivotal role of religion for the upkeep of social order was a commonplace in the early nineteenth century. Esquirol had established what happened in a country with weak religious foundations: "The influence of religion over the conduct of the people being weakened, in order to keep men in obedience governments have had recourse to police". This had a dire consequence; "it is the police which haunts weak imaginations. Asylums are filled with monomaniacs, who, fearing this authority, have gone mad upon the subject, and believe that they are constantly pursued."'34
Esquirol deplored the substitution of selfishness for ethics: A cold egotism has dried up all the sources of sentiment: there no longer exist domestic affections, respect, attachment, authority, or reciprocal dependencies; every one lives for himself; none are anxious to form those wise and salutary provisions which ought to connect the present age with those which are destined to follow it.135
The Burkean overtones in this passage are evident. But Burke's target, the revolution, was history. Esquirol was talking about another kind of social lesion, he called it "perfect selfishness",136 Jacobi called it SelbstsuchtI37-it was the disease of the age of capitalism.
Many contemporaries perceived that they were living through a phase of change. The way in which they theorized this is indicative of their political standpoints as well as of their ontology.
Some writers attributed the apparent change of manners to a reorganization of society as a whole, or to a changed mode of production. Others would not follow the turn to sociological analysis in the course of which they saw morality being relativized and ruled out as an explanatory category. The notion of alienation was widespread. But some philosophers-most famously, of course, Karl Marx-came to see this as a socioeconomic phenomenon, whereas philosophizing physiologists such as Prichard, Jacobi, and Esquirol regarded it as a phenomenon which was staged within human consciousness. It Prichard's deep piety was tied to the framework of natural theology. In all his writings Prichard was involved in a scientific theodicy, questioning why it had pleased God to inflict man with madness. We have seen how Prichard took his views on this matter from Hancock's Essay on instinct, and how he explained insanity as part of the human constitution and as a necessary corollary to the human ability to entertain fear for the future. It was, however, not just the "anticipation of wants" which was implanted in the human soul, but also the expectation of "a state of existence after death". 140 Human beings were endowed with foresight in order to survive during their earthly existence. Equally, the awareness of the Fall and of a future day of judgement was given to them so that they could govern their behaviour in such a manner as to deserve redemption on the day of atonement. Indeed, Prichard conceived of an inherent and eternal fear which was constitutionally implanted in men's mental fabric: "there is one feature common to them all," he wrote, "their prevailing character is gloomy ... A persuasion of moral demerit or a consciousness of guilt has been deeply impressed upon the minds of men in all ages".14'
It was certainly no accident that the word "gloom" appeared also in the context of insanity. In his contribution to Alexander Tweedie's Library of medicine, Prichard mentioned melancholy as characteristic of patients suffering from moral insanity: "persons in this state have no relish for the enjoyments of life; they express no feelings of consolation or happiness in the prospect of a future existence; they view everything through a medium of gloom".142 If gloom, then This interpretation of Prichard's thoughts on mankind and madness is in line with the fact that he was very reluctant to accept the category of religious madness'. He shared Heinroth's belief that piety was the best preventive against insanity. For Prichard, true Protestant belief simply could not plunge people into lunacy; in his opinion, it was never the prevalence but rather the loss of religion which made people prone to insanity. He defended this stance against the statistics which seemed to illustrate the contrary.145 And although he firmly rejected Heinroth's notion that madness was a disease of the immaterial mind, he sympathized with the idea that "moral depravity was the essential cause of madness". Heinroth's view had, for Prichard, "some foundation in truth ... Vices, inordinate passions, and the want of mental discipline" indeed tended "to increase the prevalence of insanity'.l146
The Social Significance of Moral Insanity An attempt has been made to show that moral insanity must be understood as a corollary of Prichard's conservatism in a struggle which was taking place on many levels: reform versus counter-revolution; materialist physiology versus organismic holism of body and soul; purely sociological versus "moral" or psychological explanations; secularization versus metaphysics. In this light I suggest that it does not make sense to interpret moral insanity as the concomitant of Prichard's endeavour to bolster the status of his profession. He did not aim at medically curbing the lower classes by putting forward moral insanity; nor did he devise the concept in order to facilitate a medical distinction between the good and the bad, the sane and the mad. Of course, there are non-medical origins of moral insanity, but these are to be found primarily in Prichard's moral convictions.
Stocking has repeated the suggestion, raised by Carlson and Dain, that The notion of a civil disease for the upper strata of society can be seen as linking up with Prichard's hesitation to recommend confinement: it all pandered to the attitudes of an educated class of possible clients. Asylums had in those days a poor reputation with the general public,'67 and it was very much in the interest of an alienist to play down the importance of confinement. Hence Prichard's claim that in some forms of moral insanity it was sufficient to take the management of his property out of the hands of the disturbed individual. To see moral insanity in this manner, as a polite form of madness, was a concomitant of Prichard's assumption that the disorder was characteristic of civilization. Brute men-savages as well as peasant folk-were not refined enough for the "cold egotism" which held sway in modem life and which was to a large extent responsible for the rising numbers of madmen. Also, the particular type of anxieties modem men suffered from, loss of fortune or professional ambition, were not to be found in primitive societies. Prichard commented:
The apparent increase is everywhere so striking, that it leaves on the mind a strong suspicion ... that cases of insanity are far more numerous than formerly.... It is encouraged by the reflexion that the state of society is, in most countries, such as appears likely to multiply the exciting causes of madness.... Sufficient evidence has arisen to confirm in a great measure the remark made, many years ago by M. Esquirol, that insanity belongs almost exclusively to civilized races of men: it scarcely exists among savages, and is rare in barbarous countries.168 What applied to insanity broadly speaking and to different stages of civilization, was true for moral insanity as well. Given that Prichard considered all his contemporaries to be liable to moral insanity, he logically assumed that the "more civilized" strata of society were more endangered than the lower classes. The aetiology of moral insanity covered many symptoms which were not dependent on social status. Yet there was an old tradition which regarded the refined classes as more susceptible to feeling than the ordinary strata of society. Moral insanity, defined as a disease of the passions, was therefore especially prevalent among refined and propertied people.
With moral insanity, Prichard devised a model disease which explained in psychiatric terms the despicable moral corruption of his times and, in particular, of the affluent, who had the means to indulge in "moral debasement" until they were mad. Paradoxically, this very aspect of the disease was apt to make it more palatable to the public. the concept could be called a cunning selling strategy, except that its formulation was a result of Prichard's views on human nature and his despair at the moral depravation of his time.
In addition to this link between moral insanity and the affluent classes, there is another respect in which the consideration of property was pivotal in Prichard's thought. Prichard put forward his pleas for confinement in certain cases, first of all, in the name of social order: "Of all these arrangements the maintenance of public order is the principal object, and the second is the preservation of the property belonging to the lunatic and the interest of his family."'69 It is notable that Prichard's concern circled around notions of property and the avoidance of social upheaval. Esquirol, bt contrast, had put much greater emphasis on propriety.'70 Esquirol's theory was suitable for post-revolutionary French society where the aristocracy as well as the high bourgeoisie tried to re-establish distinct social hierarchies. For him, much more than for Prichard, nymphomania and satyriasis were diseases concomitant with civil society.'7' Property was not one of the topics which specially preoccupied Esquirol. For Prichard, however, it was not social hierarchy but the preservation of peace and order which was at the centre of his concern. Legal interference was needed when a mentally disturbed person threatened to harm himself, other people or their property. Society had not only the right, but the duty to interfere with persons who, like Symonds's gentleman patient, squandered their possessions and threatened to throw their families into poverty.'72 Insanity was, for Prichard, a prevalent menace. It was not an exceptional misfortune, but rather a predicament society had to live with. All eccentric behaviour was indicative of a deranged mind. It was impossible to get rid of the affliction altogether, and since many eccentrics did no harm to anybody, their behaviour could be tolerated. But for the sake of social cohesion society had to defend itself when its law and order were attacked. This is why Prichard chose the preservation of social order, of property and personal safety, as the criteria for certification.
Conclusion
Moral insanity arose primarily out of Prichard's theological interest in sustaining the doctrine of the immaterial soul. The concept was expressive of his views on the precarious morality of modern man rather than of his desire to draw definite dividing lines between the sound and the unsound. For Prichard, man's mental health was ultimately tied to his religion. He Ironically, the course of events took a direction which was directly opposed to Prichard's designs. His zealous endeavour to sustain the doctrine of the soul against contemporary forms of medical materialism inadvertently supported another form of secularization of the mind. Prichard had referred the mechanisms of psychology to the body in order to preserve the soul's untainted immateriality. In the second half of the nineteenth century, as Michael Clark has shown, alienists would enlarge upon ideas which formed the physicalist part of the Prichardian anthropology.'74 The notion of atonement, however, which included the whole of humanity, was lost. While Prichard had fought phrenology, his successors were to combine it with moral insanity. In the later decades of the nineteenth century, theories about hereditary mental degeneration were spreading. Accordingly, men were doomed by birth, not metaphysically but in terms of their physical heritage. How easily these notions could be combined with moral insanity is exemplified in the articles of John Kitching. In the 1850s, Kitching served as the medical superintendent of the York Retreat. In his contributions to the British Medical Journal he applied doctrines of phrenology and hereditary degeneration to the concept of moral insanity. Madness was for him solely a question of "disordered functions of the brain". Moral insanity was the "arrested development in those parts of the brain, which are concerned in the due performance of the moral and instinctive faculties".175
In legal practice, by contrast, moral insanity failed to become an accepted category. Prichard's attempt to help the legal enforcement of morality proved fruitless. The McNaughton rules of 1842 confirmed the persistence of the orthodox definition of madness which presupposed outright delusion. 176 In the end, Prichard's endeavours were stifled. British law did not acknowledge moral insanity as he had hoped. Victorian alienists misinterpreted it.177 While Prichard had managed to hold a careful balance between the organic sources of the disease and its effects on man's morality on the one hand, and the organic implications of man's metaphysical framework on the other hand, subsequent generations confined moral insanity and its implications entirely to the physical sphere. Moral insanity, Prichard's legacy to medical psychiatry, was employed in conceptualizations of madness which overrode the transcendental nature of man. References to the soul were to become at best the philosophical superstructure in the belief systems of individual alienists. But on the whole metaphysics were severed from medical theories-a development which would have confirmed Prichard's worst misgivings, had he lived to witness it.
